I AM A CAMERA: SCRUTINIZING THE ASSUMPTION THAT
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM FURNISH PUBLIC VALUE BY
OPERATING AS A PROXY FOR THE PUBLIC
Cristina Carmody Tilley∗
The United States Supreme Court has held that the public has a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials and other proceedings,
in large part because attendance at these events furnishes a number
of public values. The Court has suggested that the press operates as a
proxy for the public in vindicating this open court guarantee. That
is, the Court has implied that any value that results from general public attendance at trials is replicated when members of the media attend and report on trials using the same means of perception as other members of the public.
The concept of “press-as-proxy” has broken down, however, when
the media has attempted to bring cameras into the court. The addition of cameras to the experience is thought to change the identity of
action between the public generally and the photographic press specifically during the trial process. Despite its skepticism about cameras, the Court has held there is no constitutional bar to their admission at criminal trials. But its wary acceptance of the technology has
not translated into the recognition of a constitutional right to bring
cameras into courts. Instead, the Justices have developed a sort of
constitutional demilitarized zone, in which cameras are neither prohibited nor mandated. Individual states may adopt camera admissions policies that reflect their policy preferences. State rulemakers
addressing the camera issue typically perform a cost-benefit analysis.
The primary cost—possible interference with Sixth Amendment fair
trial guarantees—has been provisionally disproven in a number of
studies. The primary benefit—achievement of the public values identified by the Court in the access cases—is typically assumed to exist
but lacks empirical documentation. The assumption of a public value
is impliedly grounded in the press-as-proxy conceit: if actual public
attendance furnishes value and if the press is a viable proxy for the
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public, and if the camera-bearing press functions identically to other
media, then cameras must furnish relevant public values. Using the
conceit to prove public value, and survey data to prove a negligible
public cost, every state has admitted cameras to one or more levels of
1
their courts.
This Article does two things. First, it examines the access cases to
distill the specific values the Supreme Court has identified as relevant
byproducts of open courtrooms; the possibility of realizing these values has dictated the constitutional scope of public access. The values
fall along a spectrum: those this Article deems “informationdependent” depend on the transmission of objective information,
while those this Article deems “response-dependent” depend on subjective citizen opinion and engagement. Second, the Article scrutinizes the assumption that as long as cameras do not impose a demonstrable fair trial cost, they achieve the relevant public values by virtue
of the press-as-proxy conceit. Studies suggest that, at least as currently produced, television news with live footage is actually inferior to
print, audio, or footage-free television at achieving the information2
dependent values the Court has identified as the basis for access.
These same studies indicate that it may be superior to other media at
fostering opinion development and emotional engagement. At a
minimum, studies of typical television news demonstrate that it does
not uniformly replicate the values furnished by the camera-free press.
In other words, the press-as-proxy conceit is not valid for the camerabearing press.
Dismantling the press-as-proxy conceit for cameras wipes out the
underlying basis for existing state camera policies, most of which rely
on the proxy as evidence of public value. Further, it represents an
obstacle to possible claims of a First Amendment right of the press to
record and televise court proceedings. The invalidity of the proxy
does not mean that cameras are categorically incompatible with court
proceedings, but it underlines the need for empirical research into
claims that cameras should be admitted because they furnish public
value. The Article concludes that policymakers weighing the costs
and benefits of camera admission—and courts weighing a First
Amendment broadcast access right—are hamstrung by the lack of
empirical research into the value of cameras in the courtroom. The
issue is timely. A significant number of states continue to bar or effectively block trial court cameras, inviting continued pro-camera ef1
2

See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
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forts.3 And the campaign for televising Supreme Court arguments
and lower federal court trials continues unabated, despite the apparent institutional resistance from the Justices and the Judicial Confer4
ence. Advocates frustrated by unsuccessful policy arguments for
more camera access to the federal courts may eventually consider a
constitutional argument as an alternate means of securing camera
5
admission to these proceedings.
Part I of this Article reviews the Court’s public access cases to tease
out the distinct public values that are thought to result from opening
courtrooms. These values include: transmission of information,
scrutiny of the legal system, checks on judicial abuse, discharge of citizen duties, confidence in the system, and catharsis in response to
significant community events. These values serve both First Amendment free speech goals and Sixth Amendment fair trial goals. The
first three values—referred to here as “information-dependent”—are
more likely to be realized when members of the public receive objective information about the legal system, whereas the latter values—
referred to here as “response-dependent”—may emerge as a result of
subjective opinion development and emotional engagement, even in
the absence of objective information. In its latter-day cases on access
to court proceedings, the Court has conditioned that right on the historic openness of the proceeding at issue and the positive contribu-

3

4

5

See infra note 124. As recently as February 2013, for instance, the Chief Judge of the New
York State Court of Appeals asked legislators to amend state laws that now obstruct camera use in the trial courts. Michael Virtanen, N.Y. Chief Judge: Open Courts to Cameras
Again, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETTE, Feb. 13, 2013.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Bucking a Trend, Supreme Court Justices Reject Video Coverage, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013, at A15 (reporting that a number of Justices in the past two years
have either reaffirmed their opposition to cameras or adopted an anti-camera stance contrary to their Senate confirmation testimony, and quoting one First Amendment expert
who has called the opposition inconsistent with free speech values).
The possibility of forcing the Justices to accept a First Amendment right of cameras at
oral argument is remote. See Alicia M. Cohn, Justice Scalia: Cameras in Supreme Court Would
‘Miseducate’ Americans, HILL (July 26, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.thehill.com/video/inthe-news/240519-justice-scalia-cameras-in-supreme-court-would-miseducate-americans
(quoting Justice Scalia’s view that “[t]he First Amendment has nothing to do with whether we have to televise our proceedings”); Mike Dorf, Cameras in Courtrooms, DORF ON L.
(Feb. 19, 2013, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/02/cameras-incourtrooms.html (observing that the Supreme Court is unlikely to find its own refusal to
allow cameras at its proceedings to violate the First Amendment). But as discussed infra
notes 79–87 and accompanying text, the Court’s trial access cases open the door to a
general argument that the First Amendment mandates some camera access rights, particularly at the trial level. In fact, camera proponents denied admission to lower federal trial courts have in the past made just this case, and have won general agreement on the
point from at least one appeals court judge. See infra note 87.
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tion to the public values that would result from opening the proceeding.
Part II demonstrates the Court’s implicit assumption that the general press operates as a proxy for the public when it attends and reports on trials using the same means of perception and communication as members of the general public. It then examines the Court’s
differential treatment of cameras to show that the press-as-proxy conceit comes undone when the media seek to film trials. The link
breaks because of the perceived unique costs associated with filming
and televising court proceedings. However, this Part demonstrates
that in cases following the declaration that cameras are not a per se
fair trial violation, the Court has left largely undisturbed the assumption that cameras are an adequate proxy for the public on the benefit
side of the ledger. The inadvertent preservation of the proxy for the
broadcast press gives rise to a presumption that courtroom cameras
produce the same public values that justify general public access to
courts.
Part III shows that camera advocates have leaned heavily on the
proxy in their campaign to change state court camera rules. Advocates consistently invoke the press-as-proxy conceit to suggest that
camera recording of trials furnishes the same public benefits as technology-free media attendance at trials. Policymakers adopting procamera rules have followed suit, alluding to the public value of cameras without scrutinizing the basis for the claim. This equation—a
documented absence of cost and an assumed benefit—has yielded a
nationwide trend in favor of cameras.
Part IV examines the accuracy of the broadcast-press-as-proxy
conceit. It reviews communications studies research into viewer recall, comprehension, and response to television news. Studies indicate that live footage used in television news does not add to—and in
fact detracts from—viewer recall and understanding of information
in a story. This literature suggests that several of the public values
thought to justify camera access to trials are demonstrably not
achieved by television news featuring courtroom footage. Consequently, this Part indicates that the press-as-proxy conceit is deeply
flawed for television news featuring live footage.
The Article concludes that policymakers deciding whether cameras furnish a net public benefit cannot rely on the assumption that television news featuring live footage is a proxy for public attendance at
trials. If the proxy is invalid as evidence of public value, those considering camera access—whether state rulemaking bodies weighing
the soundness of a camera policy or courts asked to recognize a First
Amendment right to film trials—require empirical studies of the like-
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lihood that actual television news reports integrating courtroom footage furnish public value. This type of study has been neglected to
date, largely because the press-as-proxy conceit has been used in its
place as proof of benefit. The dismantling of the proxy highlights
the urgent need for research on the efficacy of televised court proceedings in achieving public values.
I. THE PUBLIC VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH ACCESS TO COURTROOMS
In a line of cases stretching from 19486 to 1986,7 the Supreme
Court has considered multiple times the constitutional justifications
for the “public trial” guarantee. As a matter of text and history, the
8
right was long grounded in the Sixth Amendment. For years, the
Court interpreted the public trial right with primary reference to the
protection of individual defendants, while acknowledging that public
9
values were created as a byproduct of the right. But because a Sixth
Amendment-centered right of access prioritizes a criminal defendant
over the public generally, the Court has been asked several times to
curtail public attendance—and media participation—where it is al10
leged to jeopardize fair trial rights. Eventually, the Court resolved
this ongoing tension when it recognized a freestanding First
Amendment guarantee of public access to trials, subject to measures
11
necessary to guarantee Sixth Amendment rights. Throughout the
access cases, the Court has repeatedly stated that access is justified
because of its potential to furnish to the public specific, constitution12
ally prized, values. These values are public information; public scrutiny of the legal system; checks on judicial abuse; citizen participation
in government; public confidence in the legal system; and communi13
ty therapy in response to significant events. Having expanded the
access right from a pure Sixth Amendment mechanism to a combined Sixth Amendment-First Amendment mechanism, the Court
eventually suggested that First Amendment-based access claims

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
See infra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
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turned on the likelihood that access would make a “positive contribu14
tion” to the public values.
A. Public Access: The Sixth Amendment Baseline and the First Amendment
Enhancement
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
15
trial.” After the federal government adopted a public trial guarantee in 1791, most states followed suit with similar state constitutional
16
provisions. In 1948, based on the Sixth Amendment public trial
guarantee, the Court invalidated the conviction of a petitioner who
was tried and convicted in the chambers of a Michigan judge acting
17
pursuant to the state’s “One-Man Grand Jury” mechanism. At a
minimum, the Court suggested, the public trial guarantee meant that
“relatives, friends, and counsel” of a defendant were entitled to at18
tend his trial. How far beyond this group the Sixth Amendment
mandate extended the scope of the “public” entitled to attend was
unclear. In other settings, the Court had signaled that the guarantee
was widely available—it observed in a case affirming the right of trial
attendees to report on what they saw and heard in the courtroom, it
observed that “[w]hat transpires in the courtroom is public proper19
ty.” Despite this generous description, the derivation of the right
from the defendant-protective Sixth Amendment left open the possibility that segments of the public unaligned with the defendant could
be excluded consistent with the Sixth Amendment.
The Court tackled that issue in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, where a
trial judge closed a pretrial suppression hearing at the unopposed
20
request of a murder defendant. The Court determined that the
Sixth Amendment “public trial” guarantee was held by the defendant
and not by individual members of the public such as the journalists
21
who challenged the closure after the fact. The decision, which drew
three concurrences and a partial dissent from four members of the

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267 (1948).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 271–72.
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
443 U.S. 368, 376 (1979).
Id. at 379.
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Court, was widely decried by commentators.22 Many complained that
if the access right was held exclusively by the defendant, he could
waive it and thereby effectively shut the public out of the court pro23
ceeding.
Just a year later, the Court responded to these complaints and its
own internal divisions by dramatically expanding the constitutional
foundation of the public trial guarantee. The public at large held a
distinct right of access to trials, it determined, by virtue of the First
24
Amendment. The rights of free speech, press, and assembly assure a
“right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal
25
trials have long been.” At the same time, the Court held that upon a
finding that openness could compromise fairness, public access
26
might have to give way.
After identifying this First Amendment-derived basis for the open
trial guarantee, the Court eventually extended the open trial guaran27
28
tee to voir dire and some preliminary criminal hearings; it has also
remarked in dicta that the presumption applied to civil as well as
29
criminal proceedings.
B. The Public Values Associated with Access to Court Proceedings
In its cases establishing the scope of the public access right under
the Sixth and First Amendments, the Court has discussed repeatedly
30
the values that can be realized when the public has access to trials.
Roughly categorized, they include public information, public scruti-

22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1568–69 (2010) (describing media criticism of the DePasquale decision).
Bill Barnhart, Justice Stevens and the News Media: An Exercise in Exposition, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 657, 684–85 (2012).
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 581 n.18.
Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1984).
Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. 1, 9–14 (1986).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (plurality opinion).
See infra notes 32–69 and accompanying text. Moreover, constitutional imperatives are
satisfied if the courtroom is open and creates the opportunity for public value, whether
or not the value actually materializes in any particular proceeding. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) (“The requirement of a public trial is
satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and
to report what they have observed.”).
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ny, checks on judicial abuse, discharge of citizen duties, public confi31
dence, and community therapeutic value. Each is discussed below.
Conveyance of Information to the Public. The Court has noted repeatedly that open trials are beneficial because they provide to the public
information about how the courts and legal system function. In Estes
v. Texas, despite finding that the media had overreached in the case
before him, Justice John Marshall Harlan II stated that “[m]any trials
32
are newsworthy.” Sheppard v. Maxwell, overturning the denial of a
habeas petition filed by a murder defendant convicted after intense
and unruly media behavior in the courtroom, nevertheless echoed
33
this point. The Court observed that the press has a role in judicial
34
administration because it “publish[es] information about trials.” In
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, the Court reversed a state trial judge’s
gag order on the press, extending protection for “[t]ruthful reports
35
of public judicial proceedings” that inform the public. Concurring
in the judgment, Justice William Brennan extolled the press for contributing to “public understanding of the rule of law and to compre36
hension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system.” In
DePasquale, the Court denied that the general public had a Sixth
Amendment right to attend trials, but observed that public trial access was nevertheless valuable because it “[gave] the public an oppor37
tunity to observe the judicial system.” The dissenters in that case
agreed that crime, prosecutions, and the judicial proceedings surrounding them are legitimate matters of public concern, and that
open trials “provide a means for citizens to obtain information about
38
the criminal justice system.” In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
recognizing a First Amendment foundation for a public access right,
the Court repeated that opening trials leads to “public understanding
of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the en-

31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38

In a single stray dictum, Chief Justice Burger mentioned that trials were historically a way
to “pass[] the time” as a form of entertainment, but as that justification appears just once
and is not developed throughout the cases, its weight as a policy basis for opening trials
seems slight. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion) (quoting 6 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834, at 436 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1976)).
381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
384 U.S. 333, 338 (1966).
Id. at 350.
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tire criminal justice system;”39 this public information function was
thought to operate both with regard to “the system in general and its
40
workings in a particular case.”
Public Scrutiny. The Court has suggested that public access to trials
can lead to public scrutiny of individual proceedings and of the criminal justice system as a whole.
The trial-specific value of public scrutiny was introduced in In re
41
Oliver. The Court amplified the theme in DePasquale, when it determined that the guarantee of openness in the Sixth Amendment
was designed for the benefit of the individual defendant in each trial.
The public was on hand during criminal trials to “see [that the accused was] fairly dealt with and . . . [to] keep his triers keenly alive
42
to . . . the importance of their functions.” Richmond Newspapers reaffirmed this trial-specific public scrutiny value, noting that public attendance historically “gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the
misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or par43
tiality.”
A second “scrutiny” value, focusing on oversight of the criminal
justice system as an institution, also arises in the access cases. Effectively granting habeas review in Sheppard because of media run amok,
the Court observed that the press was typically an integral part of effective judicial administration because it “subject[s] the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criti44
cism.” This theme is one of the most prominent throughout the
access cases. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, when the Court condoned the publication of a rape victim’s name after it was circulated
in open court, it remarked that “the function of the press . . . bring[s]
to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administra45
tion of justice.” It appears in Nebraska Press Ass’n, when the Court
39
40

41
42
43
44
45

448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)).
Id. at 572. Notably, at least one Justice has taken issue with a “public education” justification for courtroom access premised on merely acquainting the public with the trial process. “[T]he function of a trial is not to provide an educational experience; and there is a
serious danger that any attempt to use a trial as an educational tool will both divert it
from its proper purpose and lead to suspicions concerning the integrity of the trial process,” worried Chief Justice Warren. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 575 (1965) (Warren,
C.J., concurring).
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
443 U.S. at 380 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.25).
448 U.S. at 569 (plurality opinion).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
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said that “truthful reports of public judicial proceedings [by the
press] . . . subject[] the . . . judicial process[] to . . . public scrutiny
46
and criticism.” Justice Brennan added in concurrence that press
coverage of public trials can “improve the quality of [the justice] system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public
47
accountability.” It appears in DePasquale, where the Court declined
to find an access right held by the public but acknowledged that
“[o]penness in court proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony, [and] cause all trial participants to perform their duties more
48
conscientiously.” The DePasquale minority specifically asserted that
access was not for the benefit of the accused, but instead to allow for
a public quality control function over the criminal justice system as a
whole; Bentham had argued that public trials “relat[ed] to the integrity of the trial process,” and the minority agreed that they “safeguard
49
the integrity of the courts.” Richmond Newspapers repeated the justification that openness guaranteed systemic public scrutiny, because
media presence “historically has been thought to enhance the integ50
rity and quality of what takes place.” Concurring in the judgment,
Justice Brennan said that “[p]ublicity serves to advance several of the
particular purposes of . . . the judicial[] process. Open trials play a
fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our judicial system to
51
assure [fair proceedings].”
Checks on Judicial Abuse. The Court has emphasized repeatedly
that open court proceedings furnish an antidote to judicial abuses.
Preventing or responding to judicial abuse arguably overlaps with the
public scrutiny values, but the Court has highlighted it as a specific
value. The Court has noted more than once that Bentham concep52
tualized open trials as a check on possible judicial abuse. In Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan pointed out that the threat of judicial abuse of power is offset by “contemporaneous review in the
53
forum of public opinion.”

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

427 U.S. 539, 559–60 (1976).
Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
Id. at 423, 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 589–90; DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)). But
see infra note 77 (questioning whether consideration of public opinion is appropriate in
judicial decision making).
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Discharge of Citizen Duties. The Court has often suggested that
open access to trials provides public value by giving citizens the information and motivation necessary to effectively participate in government. In his DePasquale concurrence, Justice Lewis Powell argued
that open courtrooms give citizens access to “information needed for
54
the intelligent discharge of . . . political responsibilities.” The dissenters in DePasquale agreed that opening courtrooms produced information on crime, prosecutions and judicial proceedings essential
55
in order for citizens to weigh in on “public business.” They observed that open trials serve “an important educative role” because
“[j]udges, prosecutors, and police officials often are elected or are
subject to some control by elected officials, and a main source of in56
formation about how these officials perform is the open trial.” Concurring in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan stated that “valuable
57
public debate . . . must be informed,” and added that because adjudicating cases is a governmental function, citizens have a stake in knowing about it.
Public Confidence. The notion that open trials further public confidence in the legitimacy of the judicial system was articulated in Justice Harry Blackmun’s DePasquale dissent, to bolster the minority view
that the Sixth Amendment open trial guarantee was held by the public as well as the accused. He explained that public witness to the appearance that justice was being done was essential to “public confi58
dence” in “the rule of law and in the operation of courts.” A
plurality of the Court embraced the “public confidence” justification
for opening trials in Richmond Newspapers. Public trials lead to acceptance of “the process and its results,” which leads to “confidence
59
in judicial remedies.” Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan
agreed that in a civilization “founded upon principles of ordered liberty,” the community must “share the conviction that they are gov60
erned equitably.” Declaring that cameras were not a per se violation
of the Sixth Amendment, the Court repeated this theme in Chandler
v. Florida, citing the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that tele54
55
56
57
58
59
60

443 U.S. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 412–13 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975)).
Id. at 428.
448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).
DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571–72 (plurality opinion) (quoting 6 WIGMORE, supra
note 31, § 1834, at 438).
Id. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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vised proceedings would lead to public “confidence in the [trial]
61
process.” Notably, language in these opinions suggests that as with
the “public scrutiny” value, the “public confidence” designed to be
achieved by open courtrooms denotes confidence in the system as a
62
whole, as well as confidence in particular trial outcomes. The Court
has theorized that the public would be more accepting of even unpopular results in specific cases if they resulted from open, rather
63
than closed, proceedings.
Community Therapy. The Court fully elaborated the value of community therapy or social catharsis in Richmond Newspapers, stating that
public trials had an important “therapeutic” function. Public trials
provide an outlet for the community impulse to vengeance in re64
sponse to a “shocking crime,” the Court said. It pointed to expert
views that “[t]he accusation and conviction or acquittal, as much
perhaps as the execution of punishment, operat[e] to restore the imbalance which was created by the offense or public charge, to reaffirm the temporarily lost feeling of security and perhaps, to satisfy
65
that latent ‘urge to punish.’” The Court suggested that because
community members have ceded to the state the function of imposing punishment, they need assurance that the state is carrying out
that function in order to secure the continued acquiescence in the
66
state monopoly on violence. Although this theory was fully articulated in Richmond Newspapers, the Court had subtly alluded to it in
previous cases. For instance, mentions of a “proper public interest in
67
[the] testimony” of the accused and to the need for public confi68
dence in the “ability of the courts to administer the criminal laws,”
61
62

63

64
65
66
67
68

Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 565 (1981) (citing In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla. 1979)).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion) (“People in an open society do
not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing.”).
Id. at 571 (“A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where
the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.”). But see infra
note 74 (discussing that many viewers of the Casey Anthony murder trial were convinced
after following the trial that she had killed her child and were therefore outraged by the
“not guilty” verdict, which apparently reflected jurors’ finding of insufficient evidence rather than actual innocence).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion).
Id. (quoting Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1961)).
Id. (observing that a community unaware that society’s agreed response to a crime is “underway” will be tempted to pursue vigilante justice).
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and “in the rule of law”69 seem targeted at the concept that the public
is entitled to assurance that the state is properly conducting its role as
enforcer of social norms.
In sum, the Court has alluded to six distinct public values that are
the goal and justification for allowing the public free access to criminal and civil trials, pretrial hearings, and voir dire. The benefits derived from public access to trials include conveyance of information
about the justice system, public scrutiny of the justice system, checks
on judicial abuse, citizen participation in the justice system, confidence in the justice system, and community therapy in response to
significant events.
The six values can be fairly described as sitting along a spectrum.
At one end are the information, scrutiny, and prevention of judicial
abuse values, which will not materialize absent retention and comprehension of objective information about legal rules and legal actors—what can be called “information-dependent values.” At the
other end are the discharge of duties, public confidence, and community therapy values, which depend less on acquiring objective information and more on the development of subjective opinion and
emotional engagement with the system—what can be called “response-dependent values.”
C. The First Amendment Test for Expanding Access
The Court has indicated that requests to expand the First
Amendment access right to courtroom proceedings beyond the basic
right to attend criminal trials, voir dire, and some preliminary hearings are subject to two limiting principles. In Globe Newspapers Co. v.
Superior Court, decided two years after Richmond established a First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, Justice Brennan noted
that access to other court proceedings should be determined based
70
on whether the proceeding was historically considered open and
69
70

Id. at 448.
The cases do not make clear whether the two-part test, historical pedigree and “significant role” in self-government, is conjunctive or disjunctive, instead describing the considerations as “complementary.” Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (discussing the two considerations that the Court has traditionally emphasized when dealing with claims of a First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings). Further, Press-Enterprise II suggests
some disagreement over the kind of historical pedigree sought as a justification for access. The majority in that case found the historical consideration satisfied by a commonlaw trend among multiple states to open pretrial proceedings to the public. Id. at 10–11.
In contrast, Justice Stevens in dissent suggested that the historical consideration requires
the access at issue to have been part of the legal fabric at the time the First Amendment
was adopted. Id. at 22–23.
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whether access to the proceeding would “play[] a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the govern71
ment as a whole.” The “significant role” as described by Brennan
included “[p]ublic scrutiny,” “public respect for the judicial process,”
72
“public . . . participat[ion],” and “checks [on] the judicial process”
—in short, what this Article has described as the public values. Elaborating on the application of this test where an access claim is premised on the First Amendment, Justice John Paul Stevens explained
that “a claim to access cannot succeed unless access makes a positive
73
contribution to [the] process of self-governance,” an apparent reference to the public values that justify access. This “positive contribution” consideration dictates that access will not be granted absent an
indication that opening the proceeding may furnish a public value
74
the Court has identified as relevant.
71
72
73
74

457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
Id.
Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Court has not made clear whether realization of a single public value satisfies the
“positive contribution” test, or whether multiple or even all of the values would have to be
realized. Notably, the information-dependent values are in some tension with the response-development values. At one end of the spectrum, the Court seems to be endorsing rational responses to court proceeding, while at the other, it acknowledges a place for
emotional responses. This conflict is not surprising, as it replicates an evolution in the
Anglo-Saxon approach to appropriate methods of public decision-making in trials. Trials
were originally seen as opportunities for the public to develop and impose normative
opinions about the accused without full consideration of the facts, as Chief Justice Warren observed in his Estes concurrence. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 557–58 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring). But over time, the trial process evolved from
[a] ritual practically devoid of rational justification to a fact-finding process, the
acknowledged purpose of which is to provide a fair and reliable determination of
guilt.
An element of rationality was introduced in the guilt-determining process in
England over 600 years ago when a rudimentary trial by jury became the principal
institution for criminal cases.
Id. at 557 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The modern disdain for emotional decisionmaking has been said to explain some
judges’ instinctive opposition to televising trial footage:
[P]rint is associated with rationality, while images are associated with irrationality.
Reading and writing are understood to be one step removed from an event; there
is a process involving thinking that occurs between a person and the event he or
she is learning about. . . . Photographic images, on the other hand, appear to reproduce reality, and can create an impression that one is actually experiencing the
event being depicted. Thus, images can create visceral reactions. The imagined
viewer of images—irrational, emotional—is opposed to the rational citizen imagined by much of democratic theory.
Katrina Hoch, Images and Judges: Why Cameras and Courtrooms Conflict 11–12 (Feb.
11, 2008) (unpublished paper presented at the National Communication Association
94th Annual Convention) (on file with the National Communication Association).
At the same time, the Court itself has specifically identified “community therapy”—an
experience that is emotion-dependent—as one of the justifications for opening trials.
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II. THE PRESS-AS-PROXY CONCEIT: ITS CONSTRUCTION AND ITS LIMITS
In its access cases, the Court has stated that although access rights
belong to the public, the press can and does serve as the custodian of
75
those public rights in many circumstances. The Court seems to have
accepted the press as a proxy for the public on the theory that individual members of the press act no differently than individual mem76
bers of the public would in the same setting. In contrast, when the
press has sought to behave unlike the public—specifically by recording court proceedings with cameras and using the footage to communicate about those proceedings—the Court has not seen the press
77
as a harmless stand-in. Instead, it has questioned whether institutionally distinct behavior, camera use, imposes costs that mere public
attendance would not. As it has amassed experience with cameras,
the Court has accepted that cameras do not impose costs in every circumstance. But in the years following recognition of a general public

75
76
77

Thus, the Court may be said to be working at cross-purposes in its development of the
public values. This tension complicates the inquiry into “positive contributions” made by
the broadcast press. As will be discussed infra at Part IV, television is inferior to other
media at conveying specific objective facts, but superior in engaging emotions. Because
of the way that viewers process information, emotional news stories tend to interfere with
cognition of objective information; in contrast, stories that convey complex or abstract information are considered dull and tend to be ignored. A recent example makes the
point: according to several reports, the vast majority of those who followed the trial of
Casey Anthony for the murder of her daughter were convinced that she had committed
the crime and were outraged at the jury’s “not guilty” finding. Andrew Malcolm, Casey
Anthony Found Not Guilty; Twitter Erupts in Outrage, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2011, 12:41 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/07/casey-anthony-found-not-guiltytwitter-erupts-in-outrage.html. Jurors interviewed at the close of trial concluded that the
state simply had not met its burden of proof. Jamal Thalji & Leonora LaPeter, Casey Anthony Juror #2 Says the Jury Wanted to Find Her Guilty, but the Evidence ‘Wasn’t There,’ TAMPA
BAY TIMES (July 6, 2011, 8:11 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/caseyanthony-juror-2-says-the-jury-wanted-to-find-her-guilty-but-the/1179177. Thus, the jury’s
legal conclusion was not necessarily inconsistent with the possibility that Anthony had actually taken her child’s life, but that subtlety eluded much of the viewing public. Because
television coverage of the case so successfully provided emotional engagement and community catharsis, but so poorly conveyed objective information about the legal system, it
led to a disconnect that arguably undermined public confidence in the justice process.
See, e.g., Hoch, supra, at 9 (“The on air audience will reach a conclusion and if the actual
jury reaches a different conclusion, the audience may come to distrust the process of judicial administration.”).
Should the Court be asked to evaluate a First Amendment right to televise trial footage, application of the Globe’s “positive contribution to public value” test might require
the Court to explicitly prioritize among the information-oriented values and the emotionoriented values in order to determine whether television—a medium seemingly incapable
of achieving both values simultaneously—clears the hurdle. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
See infra notes 91–102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103–18 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment right of access to courtrooms and the lifting of the
Sixth Amendment prohibition on camera access, it has not clarified
whether camera perception of, and communication about, courtroom proceedings are sufficiently similar to public perception and
communication to sustain the proxy for the broadcast press in order
to prove public value.
The viability of the proxy is crucial. At present, the Court has delegated to the states authority to decide for themselves as a matter of
78
policy whether to admit cameras. If the proxy is not valid, the policies that have been promulgated in reliance on it are dubious.
A less immediate but more important reason to examine the validity of the proxy is a constitutional one. Having lifted the Sixth
79
Amendment ban on cameras and recognized a general public First
80
Amendment access right, the Court has opened the door to arguments for a First Amendment right of camera access. In two 1978
cases, one involving camera access to prisons and one involving audi78

79
80

Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981). Cameras are not permitted as a rule in
federal courts, although federal rule-makers have permitted experimental camera access.
Beginning in 1991, the Federal Judicial Center devised a three-year pilot program in
which six district courts and two appellate courts were permitted to admit cameras.
MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ELECTRONIC MEDIA
COVERAGE OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM IN
SIX DISTRICT COURTS AND TWO COURTS OF APPEALS 1 (1994). At the close of the program, the Judicial Conference considered and rejected a recommendation to open all
federal courts to camera coverage. History of Cameras in the Federal Courts, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Multimedia/Cameras/history.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
Eventually, the Conference voted to allow every court of appeals to decide for itself
whether to admit cameras; the Second and Ninth Circuits voted to permit camera coverage. Id. The Judicial Conference initiated a second experiment in 2011, providing for
taped footage from fourteen federal courts to be uploaded onto a government website
for public viewing. See Cameras in Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Multimedia/Cameras.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). Because cameras are generally
prohibited in federal trial courts, whereas they are permitted in state courts that choose
to admit them, this Article refers throughout to “states” and “state courts.” However, if
and when the Judicial Conference revisits the possibility of changing its rule to a procamera presumption, the same argument made in the Article—that proof of public value
requires independent evidence and cannot be provided by assuming that the broadcast
press is a proxy for the public—would apply.
Interestingly, one might argue that some of the public values identified by the Court
as the basis for public access to trials have less purchase in the federal setting. Because
Article III judges have life tenure and are intended to occupy a “special, countermajoritarian” position in government, public scrutiny of and exercise of duties with regard to
federal judges may not be as salient as those values are for state court judges, who because
of limited terms subject to reappointment or election are meant to be directly accountable to public opinion. See Hoch, supra note 74, at 7.
Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597–98 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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otaping of tapes played in open court, the Justices rejected First
81
Amendment access rights for audio or videotaping devices. However, those cases preceded the recognition of a First Amendment right
82
to courtroom access and the clear elimination of a Sixth Amend83
ment camera ban. Those developments arguably throw a shadow on
the earlier anti-camera rulings, decided when Sixth Amendment
pressure against cameras was weightier and First Amendment interests in trial coverage were slighter. Camera advocates have tried to
exploit this constitutional uncertainty in the past. The Florida court
that adopted the camera policy challenged in Chandler was asked by
the news media to declare a First Amendment right of camera ac84
cess. The state court rejected that argument but changed the rule
85
nonetheless for policy reasons. Reviewing the Florida policy, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that a First Amendment argument had
86
been made below, but conspicuously declined to comment. The
question appears to remain open, and litigants have revived the ar87
gument from time to time in the federal courts of appeal. A First
Amendment argument for camera admission would have to pass the
complementary Globe tests of historical acceptance and positive con88
tribution to the public values to succeed. If the majority in Press81
82
83
84
85
86
87

88

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1978) (plurality opinion); Nixon v. Warner
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (plurality opinion).
Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575.
In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 774 (Fla. 1979).
Id.
Chandler, 449 U.S. at 569–70.
See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984)
(denying CNN’s argument that it had a First Amendment right to film the libel trial of
renowned General William Westmoreland against CBS); but see id. at 24 (Winter, J., concurring in judgment) (finding a First Amendment right of the press to film trials, bounded in this case by legitimate time, place, or manner restrictions). See also United States v.
Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument of reporter that he had
a First Amendment right to tape and televise the trial of former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying
press a First Amendment right to film the trial of federal judge Alcee Hastings).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982). Notably, well before the Court had established a First Amendment right of access to the courtroom in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), Justice Stewart sensed in
his colleagues’ Estes opinions an expectation that the press should prove that its coverage
furnished public value. This expectation, borne out in Globe, struck him as impermissible
censorship:
While no First Amendment claim is made in this case, there are intimations in the
opinions . . . which strike me as disturbingly alien to the First and Fourteenth
Amendments’ guarantees against federal or state interference with the free communication of information and ideas. The suggestion that there are limits upon
the public’s right to know what goes on in the courts causes me deep concern. The idea of imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of

714

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

Enterprise II was correct that “history” included prevailing trends
89
among the states, cameras arguably clear that hurdle, having been
admitted in at least one court in every state over the past several dec90
ades. The remaining question is whether they make a positive contribution to the public values that underlie access. If the proxy is valid, the answer is yes. If the proxy is invalid, further proof would be
needed to support a First Amendment camera access argument. This
Part reviews the history of the proxy, its suspension when cameras are
at issue, and the possibility of its revival in light of a provisional consensus that cameras do not threaten trial fairness.
A. Court Assumption That Press Acts as Proxy
Throughout the line of cases assessing the rights of the press to
access government locations and materials, the Court has repeatedly
asserted that the press right of access is identical to the public right of
91
access. Further, it has assumed that because reporters are members
of the public employing the same modes of perception as the public,
they effectively carry out their role as an agent of the public. In fact,
as seen in the Court’s discussion of public benefits in the access cases,
it often refers to the benefits of public attendance and press coverage
92
interchangeably.

89
90

91
92

justifying its presence is contrary to where I had always thought the presumption
must lie in the area of First Amendment freedoms. And the proposition that nonparticipants in a trial might get the ‘wrong impression’ from unfettered reporting
and commentary contains an invitation to censorship which I cannot accept.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 614–15 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Justice Stewart retired the year before the Court decided Globe, which established the
positive contribution to public value requirement for requests to extend access beyond
physical attendance at criminal trials. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1986).
See Cameras in the Court: A State-by-State Guide, RADIO & TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N
(Sept. 16, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.rtdna.org/article/cameras_in_the_court_a_state_
by_state_guide_updated (providing a summary of each state’s policies regarding the use
of cameras and other electronic devices in courtrooms).
See infra notes 99–102.
Although the Court has emphasized that the press is entitled to the same rights as the
general public to access courtrooms and other government institutions, it has never held
that the press is entitled to access over and above that given to the public. In Estes, the
Court made clear that newspaper, television, and radio reporters all have the same privilege to attend court proceedings: “[a]ll are entitled to the same rights as the general
public.” 381 U.S. at 540. The Court reiterated this view in Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., holding
that media requests for exceptions to a prison access policy would not be granted to provide additional media access. 417 U.S. 843, 849–50 (1974). Justice Powell, dissenting,
agreed that “neither any news organization nor reporters as individuals have constitutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens.” 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J.,
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The notion that the press is an appropriate proxy to assert the
public’s access rights appears to rest on two dynamics: attendance
limitation and perception replication.
First, members of the press are, for institutional reasons, more
likely to be physically present in the courtroom (or other government
location) than are members of the public. The media is tasked with
attending trials and visiting government institutions, whereas the average American lacks the time, proximity and financial resources to
be on hand. “No individual can obtain for himself the information
needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities.
For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy
events is hopelessly unrealistic,” Justice Powell, dissenting, observed
93
in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. The point was repeated in Cox: “[I]n
a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources
with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government,
he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient
94
form the facts of those operations.” Concurring in DePasquale, Justice Powell repeated that “each individual member [of the public]
cannot obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent
95
discharge of his political responsibilities.”
Second, the Court has suggested that the press is an appropriate
proxy for the public because reporters in the courtroom and elsewhere will use the sensory powers of observation and communication
that members of the public would have used if present. “Those who
see and hear what transpired [in the courtroom] can report it with
impunity,” a plurality of the Court noted in Estes, quoting Craig v.
96
Harney. Pointedly, it has described the press as the “eyes and ears”
of the public. “[T]he role of the media is important; acting as the
‘eyes and ears’ of the public, they can be a powerful and constructive
force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public busi97
ness.” For instance, where the media was present in open court to
hear Richard Nixon’s White House tapes played and to view exhibits
shown during testimony, the Court held that the public’s access rights
were satisfied because the reporters “listen[ed] to the tapes,” read a

93
94
95
96
97

dissenting). “The underlying right is the right of the public generally,” he concluded. Id.
at 864.
Id. at 863.
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 398 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
381 U.S. at 585 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374
(1947)).
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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transcript of the tapes, and were able to “report on what [they had]
98
heard.”
Taken together, these two dynamics have led the Court to treat
the press as a proxy for the public in accessing courtrooms and other
government proceedings. Members of the Court have made the
point repeatedly in the cases.
In seeking out the news the press . . . acts as an agent of the public at
large. It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government . . . . The
press is the necessary representative of the public’s interest . . . and the
99
instrumentality which effects the public’s right.

“[P]eople now acquire [information about trials] chiefly through
the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media
claim of functioning as surrogates for the public . . . so that they may
100
report what people in attendance have seen and heard.”
“[T]he institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the ‘agent’ of interested
citizens, and funnels information about trials to a large number of
101
individuals.”
“[T]he press serves as the information-gathering agent of the pub102
lic . . . .” In sum, so long as the press is exercising ordinary human
means of perception and communication, the Court has assumed
that it is essentially identical to the public and necessarily able to vindicate their access rights.
B. The Advent of Cameras and the Suspension of the Press-as-Proxy Conceit
Although the Court has enthusiastically embraced the idea that
the press operates as the public’s proxy to attend, observe and report
on courtroom proceedings, it has balked when the media has asked
to bring cameras along. The proxy short-circuits, it appears, because
the Court suspects technology has the potential to impose a unique
cost: it can distort trial processes and outcomes, and thus undermine
103
That is, although the press functions
Sixth Amendment interests.
identically to the public when it uses ordinary means of perception to
98
99

100
101
102
103

Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863–64
(Powell, J., dissenting)); Houchins, 438 U.S. at 39 n.36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863–64 (Powell, J., dissenting); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863–64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609.
See infra notes 105–09.
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observe and report on trials, it functions in a fashion distinct from
the public when it uses technological means of perception to record
and broadcast trials. Cameras themselves, disaggregated from the
public, have been subjected to a distinct constitutional analysis.
The Court’s first foray into the issue, a review of a Texas fraud
conviction challenged on Sixth Amendment grounds after pretrial
104
and trial proceedings were televised, reveals a deep skepticism
about cameras. “It is common knowledge that ‘television . . .
can . . . work profound changes in the behavior of the people it fo105
cuses on,’” the Court observed.
Those who see and hear what transpired [in a courtroom] can report it
with impunity . . . [b]ut the television camera, like other technological
innovations, is not entitled to pervade the lives of everyone in disregard
of constitutionally protected rights. . . . Since the televising of criminal
trials diverts the trial process from its proper end, it must be prohibit106
ed.

Concurring, Justice Harlan agreed, citing both the potential cost
to a fair trial and the alien nature of the cameras themselves. “[A]t its
worst, television is capable of distorting the trial process so as to deprive it of fundamental fairness. . . . The rights to print and
speak . . . do not embody an independent right to bring the mechanical facilities of the broadcasting and printing industries into the
107
courtroom.” Chief Justice Earl Warren objected to cameras because
they could detract from the dignity of the court. Televising trials
might “cause the public to equate the trial process with the forms of
entertainment regularly seen on television,” “to develop the personalities of the trial participants, so as to give the proceedings more drama,” and ultimately, cause “the public [to] inherently distrust our system of justice because of its intimate association with a commercial
108
In the end, the Court in Estes overturned the convicenterprise.”
109
tion at issue because of the cameras present at proceedings.
104
105
106
107

108
109

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534–35 (1965).
Id. at 569 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (quoting Kenneth B. Keating, Not ‘Bonanza,’ not ‘Peyton Place,’ but the U.S. Senate!, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1965 (Magazine), at 67, 72.
Id. at 584–85 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
381 U.S. at 588–89 (Harlan, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice Harlan admitted
that televising trials could furnish public value because these reports “might well provide
the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying [trial] content to the public.
Furthermore, television is capable of performing an education function by acquainting
the public with the judicial process in action.” Id. at 589.
Id. at 574 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 534–35 (majority opinion). The actual holding of the case was ambiguous. Four
members of the Court seemed to find camera presence a per se constitutional violation.
Justice Tom Clark authored the majority opinion; Chief Justice Warren and Justices William Douglas and Arthur Goldberg joined and concurred to underline the view that cam-
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In the following years, the Court dealt several times with media
requests to use technology outside of the trial setting, where Sixth
Amendment concerns were ostensibly absent and the benefit of cameras might be expected to hold sway. In those cases, too, the Court
seemed inhospitable to camera use. In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the
media sought to take photographs at a county jail as part of its cover110
age of local prison conditions. The jail policy permitted the press
and public to tour the facilities but prohibited cameras and other re111
cording devices. The Court upheld the prohibitions against a First
Amendment challenge, finding that the public interest in jail facilities did not justify a constitutional “right of the public or the media to
enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving
112
and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes.” Because the
prison was entitled to control access to its facilities, and because it extended the same access to both the press and the public, the First
113
Amendment was satisfied. Notably, the Court found persuasive the
sheriff’s explanation that admitting cameras and expanding media
access in other respects would impose a cost by undermining the
114
primary purpose of the jail, securing inmates. A similar calculation
was made in Nixon, where the media sought to make secondary copies
of Richard Nixon’s White House tapes, which had been played in
115
open court. Members of the media wanted their own copies of the
sound recordings so that they could broadcast portions on the air,
116
It held that the press, like other
but the Court was unmoved.
members of the general public, was entitled to hear the tapes in court
but not to take physical custody of government evidence in order to
117
The Court held that constitutional
make live broadcast possible.
access requirements were met by the airing of the tapes in open court
118
In sum, when the
and providing transcripts to all in attendance.

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

eras were a per se Sixth Amendment violation. Id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justices Stewart, Black, Brennan and White did not find it constitutionally problematic. Id.
at 602 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, in concurrence, appeared to find the
cameras a fair trial violation in the circumstances of the case without reaching a final
conclusion that cameras were facially unconstitutional. Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 6, 8–9.
Id. at 5.
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
Id. at 609–10.
Id. at 609.
Id.
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press initially asserted that its role as a proxy for the public’s access
rights included a right to use mechanical means of perception and
communication, the Court suspended the proxy and excluded the
camera or audiotape device.
C. Opening the Door for a New Press-as-Proxy Conceit
In 1980, the Court recognized a First Amendment basis for public
119
access to trials in Richmond Newspapers. In 1981, the Justices retreated from their suggestion in Estes that cameras amounted to a per se
120
Sixth Amendment violation. They held that absent conclusive evidence that cameras inherently threatened trial fairness, there existed
no constitutional basis for oversight of state court administrative au121
thority. In reaching its conclusion, the Court cited numerous studies conducted between Estes and the adoption of the Florida rule, all
purporting to show that cameras did not necessarily alter the behavior of trial participants and therefore did not as a matter of law distort trial outcomes and jeopardize Sixth Amendment fair trial guar122
As a result, cameras were deemed constitutionally
antees.
123
permissible.
Once the Court concluded that cameras were sufficiently cost-free
to lift the facial Sixth Amendment prohibition, the press-as-proxy
conceit would seem to suggest that camera-bearing press are entitled
to the same access rights as camera-free press acting as the public’s
agent. The Court did not, however, make that constitutional leap.
While it observed in Chandler that camera advocates had unsuccessfully pressed the Florida Supreme Court to recognize such a right, it was
silent on the question of a First Amendment camera right. Instead, it
referred the issue to the states for individual consideration on policy
grounds. The constitutional status of cameras was left for another
119
120
121
122

123

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573–76 (1980).
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 570–73 (1981).
Id. at 582–83 (1981).
Most of the studies involved were ex post surveys of parties who had participated in televised trials asking their self-assessment of the camera’s effect on their behavior. See, e.g.,
Alex Kozinski & Robert Johnson, Of Cameras and Courtrooms, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1107, 1112–14 (2010) (summarizing study results that consist of surveys
among jurors, judges, witnesses and attorneys who have participated in camera trials).
These kinds of studies, which have been replicated many times in states considering camera admission, have been described as unreliable. See, e.g., Christo Lassiter, TV or not
TV—That is the Question, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928, 966–67 (1996) (explaining
that surveys are flawed because respondents are inherently biased in favor of believing
that they participated objectively in a trial, and because of the small sample size involved
in most such studies).
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. at 582–83.
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day, and camera advocates ran with the argument the Court expressly
identified as the sole basis for camera admission: cameras were good
124
policy.
III. INVOCATION OF THE PRESS-AS-PROXY CONCEIT TO PERSUADE
POLICYMAKERS THAT CAMERA-ENHANCED NEWS COVERAGE FURNISHES
PUBLIC VALUE
In the onslaught of state camera initiatives that followed, the
press-as-proxy conceit has been repeatedly invoked to furnish proof
of public value. Notably, the camera debate has long been framed as
a straightforward cost-benefit measurement, weighing unfair trials
125
Perhaps because Estes signaled that cost was
against public value.
the dispositive constitutional factor, camera advocates have worked
hard over the years to prove that televised trials do not carry this
126
cost. Public value was not seen as an obstacle, very possibly because
127
of the Court’s general acquiescence in the press-as-proxy conceit.
124

125

126
127

Every state allows cameras in either its trial or appellate courts or both. See supra note 90.
However, in practice, a number of states continue to effectively block much coverage of
trial court activity. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE COMM. OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY EXTENDED MEDIA COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN MARYLAND 12–13 (2008), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/
publications/pdfs/mediacoveragereport08.pdf (“[A]n express ban on extended coverage
of criminal trial proceedings, or rules so restrictive as to effectively deny such coverage,
remains intact in fifteen states, the District of Columbia, and in all federal trial courts.”).
Further,
[t]he rules and procedures of the 35 states that permit broadcast coverage of criminal trials reveal tremendous variations as to the extent to which judges can permit
or limit the coverage, whether and to what extent jurors can be shown, and the
types of cases, such as sex offenses, family law, and trade secret matters, that are
subject to mandatory exclusions. It is, therefore, difficult to generalize as to practice in the courts of these states.
There are states as varied as Florida, which has a judicially created presumption that camera coverage should be allowed in all cases; California, which expressly forbids such a presumption and grants the presiding judge broad discretion to
permit or deny extended media coverage; and Rhode Island, which grants the trial
judge absolute and unreviewable discretion to exclude electronic media from all
or any part of a proceeding. Many states prohibit coverage of pre-trial hearings
and jury close-ups; others do not.
....
In 1997, the State of New York became the first state to rescind the media’s
statutory license to bring cameras into the courtroom after its legislature refused
to renew an experimental program it had sponsored for 10 years.
Id. at 13–15 (footnotes omitted).
See Kozinski & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1114 (“[O]n balance there is more to be
gained than lost by permitting electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings . . . .”
(quoting In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla.
1979)).
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text.
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As a result, advocates seem to have taken the public value of cameras
for granted, and offer virtually no proof that it exists. As demonstrated below, members of the press, members of the bar, and state and
federal court rulemaking bodies have made two consistent arguments
on behalf of camera admission. First, they contend that admission of
cameras will necessarily achieve the public values identified by the
128
Second, they imply that cameras furnish public values beCourt.
cause the taping and eventual television broadcast of trial footage is a
close proxy for public attendance at, and communication about, tri129
Relying solely on this broadcast press-as-proxy conceit, they
als.
have persuaded policymakers that courtroom cameras furnish the
same public value as general public and general press attendance at
trials.
A. Camera Advocates Contend Televised Trials Furnish the Public Values
Associated with Open Courtrooms
In the years since the Supreme Court condoned camera admission, advocates from the press, the bar, and the academy have worked
to persuade state and federal court rulemaking bodies that filming
trials for later broadcast—whether in gavel-to-gavel coverage or for
130
use as clips during standard television news coverage —will furnish
the same set of public values identified by the Court in its cases opening court proceedings to the general public. One report said that the
media’s “most significant arguments” in favor of cameras is that they
131
will drive public education and public confidence; that is, that they
will furnish the information-dependent and response-dependent
public values.
The advocates’ position is summarized by Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski, who has argued that cameras are essential to letting the public “appreciate our justice system, and the legal

128
129
130

131

See infra notes 132–49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.
Part IV below focuses primarily on studies of standard television news, which feature very
short clips of courtroom action within a story, usually clocking in at under two minutes.
The viewer response to gavel-to-gavel coverage may be considerably different, but has not
been studied extensively. Moreover, typical use of camera footage is in short stories
shown during half-hour or hour-long newscasts, rather than unfiltered, full-length trials.
This Article suggests that policymakers require more fully developed empirical evidence
about how the news media use courtroom footage. Among the issues that should be documented is the proportion of trials that are televised in their entirety compared with
those covered in short form during standard broadcasts.
LEGISLATIVE COMM. OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 22.
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regime that it upholds.”132 Three states in the forefront of the camera
initiative, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Florida, all explained their decision to admit cameras by focusing on the public values presumed to
be furnished by television coverage of court proceedings. In its 1956
decision to admit cameras to court proceedings, the Colorado Supreme Court pointed to the information conveyance and citizen dis133
It observed
charge of duties values to justify camera admissions.
that
there is a constant regard for the necessity of educating and informing
our people concerning the proper functioning of all three branches of
government. There is no field of governmental activity concerning
which the people are as poorly informed as the field occupied by the judiciary.
It is highly inconsistent to complain of the ignorance and apathy of
voters and then to “close the windows of information through which they
134
might observe and learn.”

Ruling in 1958 that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
permitting camera coverage of a burglary trial, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Lyles v. State alluded to multiple public values: public
scrutiny generally, judicial oversight specifically, and conveyance of
135
Broadcast coverage of trials
information about the legal system.
provided an antidote to secrecy and a safeguard against judicial abuses by allowing the public “to see how justice is done in the courts of
136
their country,” the court held. Further, cameras “educat[e] and inform[] our people concerning the proper functioning of the
courts. . . . There is no field of government about which the people
know so little as they do about the courts. There is no field of government about which they should know as much, as about their
137
courts.” And the Florida Supreme Court, which adopted the camera access policy that led to the Chandler decision, was swayed in part
by arguments of its chief justice that televised broadcast of criminal
trials could bolster public confidence in the system and provide
community therapy. In a speech later quoted back to the court by
media petitioners, the justice had stated that televised “trials could be
very helpful in making people familiar with the results of a criminal
offense, [knowledge that might have] ‘a soothing influence’ on peo132
133
134

135
136
137

Kozinski & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1129.
In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 469
(Colo. 1956).
Id.
330 P.2d 734, 742–43.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 742.
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ple.”138 State court policymakers following suit after Chandler have
agreed that televised court proceedings furnish the relevant public
values. Sharing the positive experience of the Iowa courts with camera coverage of court proceedings, Iowa Supreme Court Chief Justice
Mark Cady testified in 2011 that the benefits of expanded camera
coverage would included “a well-informed citizenry,” and “[public]
confidence in the courts,” driven by “the public’s understanding of
our job and the information the public has about how we are doing
our job. . . . [The media’s] efforts increase the visibility of . . . courts
139
California Rule of Court 1.150140 govand . . . court procedures.”
erning camera admission instructs judges asked to permit cameras to
consider, among other factors, the “importance of maintaining public trust and confidence in the judicial system;” and “the importance
141
The nowof promoting public access to the judicial system.”
defunct New York rule of court permitting cameras specifically stated
that it was promulgated “to comport with the legislative finding that
an enhanced public understanding of the judicial system is important
142
in maintaining a high level of public confidence in the Judiciary.”
Judicial policymakers have concluded that courtroom cameras
furnish public value in large part because media petitioners and bar
group opinion leaders have told them so. Recent examples are plentiful. Seeking to amend the rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona in
2008, the Arizona Broadcasters Association, in comments, contended
that allowing cameras in the court “will allow the broadcast media to
provide better and more informative news coverage of judicial pro143
Seeking camera admission in Maryland
ceedings to the public.”
state court in 2008, Michelle Butt of WBAL-TV suggested that televi144
sion “‘vindicate[s] the community interest’ in the proceedings.”
Explaining the evolution in its policy since including a camera ban in
the 1937 version of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, the ABA testified in
138
139

140
141
142
143

144

Petition for Modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct at 14 n.18, 370
So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979) (No. 46835).
Access to the Court: Televising the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10–11 (2011) (statement of
Sup. Ct. of Iowa C.J. Mark Cady).
CA. R. CT. 1.150.
Id. 1.150(e)(3).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 131.1(a) (2012). New York has since rescinded its
rule permitting cameras in trial courts. See supra note 124.
Art Brooks, Comment to R-07-0016, Petition to Amend Rule 122, Rules of the Supreme Court,
COURT RULES FORUM (May 15, 2008, 2:42 PM), http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/
AZSupremeCourtMain/AZCourtRulesMain/CourtRulesForumMain/CourtRulesForum/
tabid/91/forumid/7/postid/442/view/topic/Default.aspx.
LEGISLATIVE COMM. OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 32.
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a 2005 Senate hearing on cameras in the courtroom that “[c]ourts
that conduct their business openly and under public scrutiny protect
the integrity of the . . . judicial system by guaranteeing accountability
145
to the people they serve.” Moreover, televised courtroom proceedings “benefit the public because of the invaluable civic education that
results when citizens witness federal courts in action. . . . [creating]
146
And, when the
informed, engaged and civic-minded citizens.”
American Judicature Society adopted a pro-camera stance for federal
court proceedings, it argued that the policy would provide the “public understanding of . . . the [court] process” required to create “pub147
lic respect and support.” Further, extended television coverage
can educate the public about what actually goes on in our courts . . . .
let[ting the public] see for [itself] that, in fact, cases are routinely decided fairly and impartially, in accordance with the rule of law—that decisions are reached based on the facts and the applicable law, without re148
gard to outside influences.

Finally, it said that “exposure assists in identifying and improving de149
ficiencies.”
B. Camera Advocates Rely on the Press-as-Proxy Conceit to Prove That
Broadcasting Court Proceedings Furnishes Public Value
Advocates who assert that broadcast proceedings furnish public
value often intimate that televised proceedings replicate the experience that members of the public would have if they attended trials in
person. In fact, some advocates argue that camera-enhanced reporting of court proceedings is superior to camera-free media coverage.
As Kozinski has remarked,
For the vast majority of the population—those lacking the time or resources to travel to this out-of-the-way destination—the trial will be experienced, if at all, via second-hand accounts in the press.
. . . [C]ameras have become an essential tool to give the public a full and
150
fair picture of what goes on inside the courtrooms that they pay for.
145

146

147
148
149
150

Allowing Cameras and Electronic Media in the Courtroom: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 69–70 (2000)
(statement of Robert D. Evans, Dir. of Gov’t Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass’n).
Letter from Robert D. Evans, Dir. of Gov’t Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Senator Arlen
Specter, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Nov. 17 2005),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/letters/judiciary/051
117letter_cameras.authcheckdam.pdf.
Cameras in our Federal Courts—the Time Has Come, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y (Feb. 21, 2010),
https://www.ajs.org/judicature-journal/editorial/cameras-in-our-federal-courts.
Id.
Id.
Kozinski & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1109.
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In the petition asking Florida to admit cameras, Post-Newsweek argued that absent cameras, television trial coverage was reduced to
film of “witnesses and lawyers entering and leaving the courthouse,
jurors boarding buses, defendants and their families walking to lunch
151
Camera footage, in contrast, would permit the
with wan smiles.”
media to “cover the actual events of the trial,” and the “drama of the
courtroom will be more newsworthy than the reporter’s [stand-up]
152
An Arizona television station seeking camera
account of events.”
admission stated that “[television] coverage is the most direct and accurate tool available to allow citizens who cannot attend courtroom
proceedings in person to see for themselves what transpires in the
153
courtroom and observe the administration of justice first-hand.”
The editor of the Arizona Republic, seeking art for the news pages
and video for the paper’s on-line edition, agreed that
[t]he public has come to rely on visual images as an information source
more than ever before. Newspaper readership surveys show that readers
are increasingly pressed for time. Photographs help the public process
information and draw attention to important articles. On the Internet,
camera coverage provides an in-depth source of information for readers
who want to go beyond the information presented in the print edition.
Photographs convey moods and emotions that are often difficult to cap154
ture with text alone.

Absent cameras, “the public is often deprived of photographic news
reports, which sometimes can be the most efficient means of learning
155
about the inner workings of the judicial system.”
151
152
153

154

155

Petition for Modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct at 14 n.18, In re
Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979) (No. 46835).
Id. at 11.
Brief for Petitioner at 8, In re Petition to Amend Rule 122, Rules of the Supreme Court of
Arizona (Ariz. 2007) (No. R-07-0016), available at http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/
Portals/0/NTForums_Attach/1117234892158.pdf.
See rlovely, Comment to R-07-0016, Petition to Amend Rule 122, Rules of the Supreme Court,
COURT RULES FORUM (May 19, 2008, 12:47 PM), http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/
AZSupremeCourtMain/AZCourtRulesMain/CourtRulesForumMain/CourtRulesForum/
tabid/91/forumid/7/postid/442/view/topic/Default.aspx (statement of Arizona Republic
Editor Randy Lovely).
Id. In one of the very few efforts to document the asserted role of the press as proxy in
furnishing public value, Lovely said that “studies have concluded that camera coverage
improves the public’s knowledge of the judiciary and helps citizens relate the legal system
to their everyday lives.” Id. The “studies” he cited were reports prepared by camera proponents expressing their view that televised coverage of courts would furnish public benefits; none cited empirical evidence of how the media actually used footage or how viewers
actually responded to it. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, In re Petition to Amend Rule 122,
Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona (2007) (No. R-07-0016) (citing In re Petition of
WMUR Channel 9, 813 A.2d 455, 460 (N.H. 2002), available at
http://azdnn.dnnmax.com/Portals/0/NTForums_Attach/1117234892158.pdf
(citing
opinions of camera proponents that televised trials furnish public value)); N.Y. STATE
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The Colorado court seemed to agree that the broadcast press was
a close proxy for the public, suggesting that cameras were a “window”
through which observers could “observe and learn,” and that cameras
would assure “people . . . free observation and the utmost freedom of
discussion of the proceedings of public tribunals that is consistent
156
with truth and decency tends to the public welfare.”
In sum, this selection of pro-camera arguments made and accepted by state and federal court rulemakers reveals that while advocates
have made broad claims about the public value furnished by courtroom cameras, these claims lack documentary proof. Instead, advocates rely almost exclusively on the assumption that the broadcast
media act as a close proxy for the public, equal to the general press
proxy endorsed by the Court. Constructing their public policy argument in this fashion has placed significant weight on the viability of
the broadcast-press-as-proxy conceit. If it fails, advocates have virtually no proof of public value furnished by cameras. As discussed below,
empirical evidence on viewer response to television news reveals deep
flaws in the broadcast-press-as-public-proxy conceit. This casts doubt
on the wisdom of camera admission policies and represents a steep
barrier to the eventual recognition of a First Amendment right of
camera access.
IV. DISPROVING THE PRESS-AS-PROXY CONCEIT IN CAMERA-ENHANCED
NEWS COVERAGE
The broadcast-press-as-proxy conceit—invoked by camera advo157
cates as far back as Estes —seems uncontroversial and intuitive on its
face: “Of all the media of information, none portrays the courtroom
scene, the spoken word and the appearance of the participants so accurately as the television camera. There is no chance for mistake or
erroneous interpretation,” the camera advocates asserted in that
158
case. Advocates have been implying for some time that cameras are
inherently likely to realize public values in the same way that actual

156
157
158

COMM. TO REVIEW AUDIO-VISUAL COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, AN OPEN
COURTROOM: CAMERAS IN NEW YORK COURTS 70–71 (1997) (summarizing views of camera proponents that televised trials will furnish public value). But see LEGISLATIVE COMM.
OF THE MD. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 22–33 (finding that the only four
available academic studies touching on the use of television footage to cover legal issues
did not support the claim that cameras in the courtroom furnished “public value”).
In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 469–
70 (Colo. 1956).
381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Brief for Respondent at 24, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (No. 256) 1965 WL
115506, at *24.
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public attendance or camera-free media would.159 But this implication wilts under empirical scrutiny. As discussed in Part I, the list of
public values identified by the Court as the goals and justifications of
courtroom access falls into roughly two categories: informationdependent values and response-dependent values. Television news is
demonstrably worse than public attendance or camera-free media at
transmitting objective information, and thus does not realize the in160
formation-dependent values. Why? At least as currently produced,
it appears to actually inhibit information comprehension and reten161
Further, although televition when compared with other media.
sion generally has the power to drive viewer response, the production
techniques used to present courtroom footage arguably drain the
162
This empirical background casts
unique potency of the medium.
significant doubt on the broadcast-press-as-proxy conceit that camera
advocates have been using to furnish proof of public value. This Part
analyzes current understandings of viewer response to television to
demonstrate that the proxy is deeply flawed. Without the proxy as an
evidentiary crutch to prove public value, camera advocates must independently document value to justify camera admission as a desirable policy, and a fortiori if they wish to argue in the future for a constitutional right of access for cameras.
A. Television and the “Information-Dependent” Public Values
Researchers agree that the baseline for measuring the efficacy of
various types of television news against print or radio is to start with
the verbal portion of the story; the text or script is considered the
163
“target message,” while the visual portion of the story is contextual.
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
See infra notes 163–200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 174–200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 201–12, 216, 219 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Doris A. Graber, Say It With Pictures, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85, 91
(1996) (finding that audiovisuals add a new layer of information); W. Gill Woodall et al.,
From the Boob Tube to the Black Box: Television News Comprehension from an Information Processing Perspective, 27 J. BROADCASTING 1, 8 (1983) (“Thus, an episodic memory trace of
television news could be made up of two parts: the visual context (pictures,
film/videotape images, diagrams, and graphs) and verbal information that constitutes the
target.”). One study revealed that twenty-one percent of viewers could not recall even
one news item in a broadcast within one hour of its airing. Kathy Kellerman, Memory Processes in Media Effects, 12 COMM. RES. 83, 97–98 (1985). Others have found that viewers retain just thirty-four to thirty-eight percent of the information conveyed on television news.
Id. at 98. And, in a study sponsored by the National Association of Broadcasters, survey
takers found that more than half the viewers they interviewed could not recall a single
news story from a broadcast they had watched. Id. Another study found that six to seven
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The impact of news can be assessed along two axes: viewer recall and
comprehension and viewer response. Several studies have shown that
given identical verbal texts, television viewers recall far less than print
164
In addition, correlational studies show that newspaper
readers.
165
readers are much better informed than viewers of television news.
The cognitive information retention results are initially surprising,
given current understandings of how information is stored in
memory. The prevalent theory, known as dual-coding, hypothesizes
that “audiovisual information is stored in memory in two separate but
associated codes—one verbal and one visual—whereas text-only information is stored in a verbal code only. During recall, the visual
memory code serves as an extra retrieval cue, which could enhance
166
recall.” Therefore, because television (unlike print or radio) operates on both a verbal and visual level, it presents “dual-coding” oppor167
tunities and in theory, could achieve superior recall by viewers.
Further, one inherent characteristic of live footage—
concreteness—is generally thought to enhance recall. “Concrete” information—information rich in detail and specifics about people and
168
actions —prompts deeper processing and is more likely to be recalled, studies show. For instance, one study showed that concrete
nouns, such as dog or apple, are better recalled than abstract nouns,
169
such as truth or justice. This dynamic would appear to give television news a recall edge over print news, as studies suggest that pictures can help viewers “concretize” abstract or unfamiliar concepts

164

165
166
167
168
169

weeks after exposure, viewers had better recall of actual facts from stories without visual
footage, and better recall of images from stories with visual footage. John Newhagen &
Byron Reeves, The Evening’s Bad News: Effects of Compelling Negative Television News Images
on Memory, 42 J. COMM. 25, 38 (1992). Consequently, it is unsurprising that in election
coverage, it was more likely that television viewers would be familiar with a candidate’s
personal biography and personal qualities than his specific stands on issues, whereas
newspaper readers were more likely to know of a political party’s positions on the issues.
See Steven Chaffee & Stacey Frank, How Americans Get Political Information: Print Versus
Broadcast News, 546 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 51–53 (1996) (comparing media and types of information people gain by accessing different source material).
Juliette H. Walma van der Molen, Assessing Text-Picture Correspondence in Television News:
The Development of a New Coding Scheme, 45 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 483, 483
(2001); see also Prabu David, Role of Imagery in Recall of Deviant News, 73 JOURNALISM &
MASS COMM. Q. 804, 806 (1996) (“Since deviance and imagery are very closely intertwined in the typical news story, better recall for deviant news can be attributed to the automatic activation in the visual subsystem from deviant and imagistic verbal stimuli.”).
Walma van der Molen, supra note 164, at 483.
Id. at 484.
Id. (citing ALLAN PAIVIO, MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS: A DUAL CODING APPROACH 146–50
(1986)).
Woodall et al., supra note 163, at 16.
David, supra note 164, at 806.
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and thus improve recall and comprehension. For instance, one study
found that pictures helped viewers recall subjects outside their nor170
mal experience, such as foreign affairs.
But television’s unique advantage over print—the ability to deploy
visual images—does not seem to pay off consistently in improved recall when viewers are tested. Although television news is able to concretize unfamiliar or abstract information by giving viewers visual
cues, researchers have found that “visuals are most frequently used to
illustrate the person and place concrete details of news stories which
171
viewers are most likely to remember anyway.” This may be a function of the relative ease of capturing visuals of people and places
when compared with finding visuals that depict abstract concepts. As
one television pioneer remarked early on, “comings and goings make
172
easy pictures; the issues usually do not.” And even concretizing visuals appear to achieve limited recall of fine details. One study
showed that viewers watching “sound bites” of speakers recalled the
gist of the speaker’s message but did not recall the speaker’s name,
title, or political affiliation presented in subtitles on the screen while
173
footage rolled.
Communications studies theories suggest that the gap between
television’s unique educational potential and its actual inferiority to
print results from limits on human ability to process divergent informational cues. The limited-attentional-capacity theory instructs that a
viewer required to process inconsistent verbal and visual cues will ex174
ceed his processing capacity and will default to the verbal cue.
However, the more visual and verbal information reinforce each other—a concept described as semantic overlap or redundancy—the bet175
ter the viewer recall. Semantic overlap exists in a televised newscast
when the verbal information relayed to the viewer by an anchor or by
a reporter stand-up or voiceover is consistent with or exemplifies the
visual information presented in a still photo or moving image within
170
171
172

173
174
175

Kellerman, supra note 163, at 102 (citing Allan Paivio, Mental Imagery in Association Learning and Memory, 76 PSYCH. REV. 241 (1969)).
Woodall et al., supra note 163, at 16.
Mickie Edwardson et al., Visualization and TV News Information Gain, 20 J. BROADCASTING
373, 374 (1976) (quoting Robert MacNeil, The News on TV and How It is Unmade, 237
HARPER’S MAG. 72, 75 (1968)) (discussing comments of former NBC board chairman
Walter Scott).
Mickie Edwardson et al., Audio Recall Immediately Following Video Change in Television News,
36 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 395, 397, 407 (1992).
Id.
See, e.g., Juliette Walma van der Molen & Marlies E. Klijn, Recall of Television Versus Print
News: Retesting the Semantic Overlap Theory, 48 BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 89, 90
(2004) (summarizing the history of research on semantic overlap theory).

730

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

the story.176 When visual and verbal information is redundant, reten177
tion is greater than it would be for the same story without a visual.
For instance, a television news story on a gas shortage accompanied
by footage of a line of cars at the pump will be recalled and under178
However,
stood better than a verbal-only story on the same issue.
where a visual has an attenuated or unclear link with the verbal, view179
For instance, if the
ers can misunderstand the story as a whole.
same gas line footage were used to accompany a story about the
threat of war in the Middle East, it would be ripe for misunderstand180
ing. And, if the visual is actively inconsistent with the verbal, retention declines further; in fact, the retention rate drops below that for
181
print news stories.
A leading study on semantic overlap is instructive. That study presented readers with three different versions of three different news
182
stories. The first story was on a state visit by Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin to Egypt to discuss reducing tension in the Middle East
183
The
stemming from settlement policy in the occupied territories.
verbal cues for the story were consistent throughout the three exper184
imental versions of the story. The first version of the story was accompanied by pictures of Israeli settlements; the second, by pictures
of an honor guard receiving Rabin, of him appearing with Egyptian
officials before cameras and at a press conference; the third, by pic185
tures of Jewish children trying a new kosher soda. The second story
involved Russian President Boris Yeltsin seeking economic assistance
for Russia because of difficulties related to government reforms while
186
at a worldwide summit meeting. Version one was accompanied by
pictures of Russian shops and homes; version two, by pictures of President Yeltsin at a world economic summit meeting with other government leaders at a banquet and at a press conference; version
three, by pictures of Yeltsin playing tennis and pictures of luxury
187
goods. The third story involved a state visit by El Salvadoran Presi176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Hans-Bernd Brosius et al., How Do Text-Picture Relations Affect the Informational Effectiveness
of Television Newscasts?, 40 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 180, 183–84 (1996).
Id.
Woodall et al., supra note 163, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Walma van der Molen & Klijn, supra note 175, at 102.
Brosius et al., supra note 176, at 186–88.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dent José Napoleón Duarte to Germany, at which he discussed dis188
turbances and human rights abuses in El Salvador. Version one was
accompanied by pictures of confrontations between protesters and
government troops; version two, by pictures of Duarte arriving in
Germany and of meetings and press conferences with German officials; and version three, by pictures of a fashion show and a press
189
ball.
After viewing the newscast with all three items, subjects were asked
both free recall and cued recall questions. The cued recall questions
were designed to test retention of specific information conveyed in
the reports, such as “What was the reason for the Israeli prime minister’s journey to Egypt?” and “What is the Russian government doing
190
The questionnaire also asked
to improve the current situation?”
the subjects for their general opinion on the topics covered, such as
“How great are the prospects for a lasting peace in the Middle East?”
191
and “Do you think that Yeltsin has the situation under control?”
For the free recall questions, those who saw the semantically overlapping stories scored an average of 8.56, those who saw the standard
picture stories scored an average of 6.36, and those who saw the text192
A group who
picture divergent stories scored an average of 5.04.
heard radio only scored 6.60, an insignificant difference from the
193
standard picture group. The same ranking was found for cued recall—semantically overlapping stories were recalled best (10.16);
standard picture stories were recalled less well and similar to pictureless radio stories (7.16); and stories with text-picture divergence were
recalled least well, and less well than verbal-only stories heard on the
194
radio (5.80).
The researchers summarized that “[t]he common habit of TV
journalists of using standard news pictures is not justified based on
the present findings. The advantage that a visual medium like television offers for using pictures is only sensibly exploited when the pic195
tures illustrate the news text.”
The semantic divergence effect seems magnified when the visual
image competing for attention is “vivid,” that is a picture or clip that
compels attention and features powerful mental images. While vivid
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Id.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 189–91.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192.
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visuals arouse emotion and can galvanize action, as discussed in Part
IV.B below, they detract from recall and understanding when they do
196
not reinforce text. For example, a news story about traffic density
in cities explained verbally that the two main problems that resulted
197
The accompanying footage showed
were noise and air pollution.
198
children running into the road while a car approached. More than
half those who watched the story later responded that child safety was
199
As one expert has
the main problem to arise from urban traffic.
summarized, the studies indicate that “viewers caught up in the dramatic aspects of a story tend to lose sight of important complexities of
200
the situation spelled out in the narrative.”
B. Television and the “Response-Development” Values
While viewers of standard television news are less likely to retain
or understand objective information than those who use other media,
studies indicate that television news may be more effective in leading
viewers to take action or develop opinions than its non-visual media
201
counterparts.
This phenomenon may be explained in part by television news’s
preference for “vivid” visuals that “compel[] attention and encour202
Vivid footage—
age[] the creation of powerful mental images.”
measured by its emotional interest, potential to trigger images, and
sensory, spatial or temporal proximity—has been found to make a
203
stronger impression on viewers than pallid information. For example, the use of vivid imagery such as air crash footage and disaster
footage can engage viewers and mobilize them to action. Television
viewers informed of an impending saltwater intrusion into the Mississippi River in a story including vivid footage of shoppers buying water
in bulk were more likely to stock up on bottled water than were
newspaper readers informed of the same threat by stories including
204
maps of Louisiana and still pictures of shoppers buying water.

196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Newhagen & Reeves, supra note 163, at 38.
Hans-Bernd Brosius, The Effects of Emotional Pictures in Television News, 20 COMM. RES. 105,
115 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Graber, supra note 163, at 90.
See infra notes 202–12 and accompanying text.
Woodall et al., supra note 163, at 16.
See id. at 16–17 (discussing the effects of vivid footage).
J. William Spencer et al., The Different Influences of Newspaper and Television News Reports of a
Natural Hazard on Response Behavior, 19 COMM. RES. 299, 314 (1992).
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The emotional charge carried by vivid television visuals can arouse
viewers to pay more attention. Perhaps for that reason, emotional
205
footage has been seen as a “catalyst for political learning.” “Drama
. . . inspires political action[,] . . . arouses empathy and spurs the will
206
to help.” While recall of specifics from a television news story may
be minimal, as discussed above in Part IV.A, in the long-term, viewers
207
emerge with “general judgments about the content of an item.”
Television news can motivate citizen participation; one study showed
that although reading print news is a greater predictor of citizen
knowledge about party positions on issues, watching television news
correlated with “voting on the basis of personal qualities” of candi208
dates.
Further, some of the most derided characteristics of television
news—its tendency to sensationalize stories and incorporate “opinionation” (whether opinions are introduced via anchor cross-talk or
the integration of punditry into newscasts)—can actually provide cues
to political action. A 1981 study of local news in Houston showed
that nearly half of the air time was devoted to sensational news.
However, many of the facially sensational stories offered “opinion re209
These resources included instruction on how citizens
sources.”
could participate in a civic activity, information on how a political
process operated, or broad background on a social issue relevant to a
210
more specific story. In fact, sensational stories were more likely to
include instruction on civic action than were non-sensational sto211
ries. In the same vein, opinionation in television news can improve
engagement. In a study, those who do not identify with a political
party were more motivated to pay attention to discussions about the
Iraq war when those discussions were not neutral but involved the
212
expression of opinion about the war.

205
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George E. Marcus & Michael B. MacKuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm and the Vote: The Emotional
Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns, 87 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 672, 672 (1993).
Graber, supra note 163, at 90 (citation omitted).
Brosius, supra note 197, at 109.
Chaffee & Frank, supra note 163, at 53.
C. Richard Hofstetter & David M. Dozier, Useful News, Sensational News: Quality, Sensationalism and Local TV News, 63 JOURNALISM Q. 815, 818–19 (1986).
Id. at 817.
Id. at 818–19.
Lauren Feldman, Annenberg Sch. for Commc’n, Univ. of Pa., The Effects of Journalist Opinionation on Learning from Televised News 2 (Apr. 22, 2008) (paper presented at May 2008
Annual Meeting of the Int’l Commc’n Ass’n), http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/
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In short, while television news has been shown inferior to other
media in transmitting the objective information required for the
Court’s information-dependent public values, it is ideally suited to
achieve response-dependent values.
C. Replication of the Information-Conveyance and Opinion-Development
Potential of Television News in Stories Using Courtroom Footage
The studies surveyed above indicate that general television news
featuring live footage or photos is worse than other media at conveying information but potentially better at engaging emotion and developing opinion. There is little specific data on whether the production techniques that yield these results appear in trial-specific news
stories that feature courtroom footage. However, four broad studies
that consider television trial coverage hint that trial stories feature the
same characteristics that inhibit the transmission of information in
other broadcast news.
One study examined coverage from the trial of New York police
213
The Diallo
officers charged with the murder of Amadou Diallo.
study considered newscasts from five local television stations over the
214
Researchers found that during 201
twelve-day course of the trial.
newscasts aired during the twelve-day trial, the majority of the coverage “consisted of reporter or anchorperson voice-overs and footage
215
The average story length was 3:35
from outside the courtroom.”
minutes, and on average each story contained seventy-eight seconds
of courtroom footage; forty-seven seconds of the courtroom footage
featured live sound, while thirty-one seconds were visual only, accom216
panied by a reporter voiceover. The study did not compare the visual and verbal messages to test for semantic overlap.
Another study considered selected news stories that resulted from
217
the 1994 federal pilot project allowing cameras in the courtroom.
Researchers reviewed ninety of the news stories featuring taped court

213
214
215
216
217

Wendy Pogorzelski & Thomas W. Brewer, Cameras in Court: How Television News Media Use
Courtroom Footage, 91 JUDICATURE 124, 125 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 78, at 34–37. The survey is somewhat problematic: first, it
was conducted by the Center for Media and Public Affairs (an advocacy group that supported camera admission); second, it relied on the media to voluntarily submit tapes of
its news coverage, meaning that the dataset was not comprehensive; and third, the federal
pilot project only permitted cameras into civil trials, leaving trends in criminal coverage
undocumented.
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footage that aired during the three-year pilot period.218 Of the news
stories using courtroom clips, the clips occupied fifty-nine percent of
the total air time with just thirty-seven percent of those clips featuring
live sound and the balance using video only accompanied by a re219
The study did not compare the verbal text and
porter voiceover.
the visual cues to assess redundancy. Sixty-two percent of the stories
220
explained what the plaintiff sought to achieve by suing, and ninetyfour percent of those explanations were provided by reporters rather
221
than by a clip of a participant stating those goals in the proceeding.
The study summarized that court footage was used to “add[] color or
emotion rather than substance to the discussion” and that the stories
did a “poor job of providing information to viewers about the legal
222
process.”
A third notable study reviewed television reporting of civil litigation generally, without restricting the dataset to stories featuring
filmed court proceedings. This study covered eleven selected media
223
markets in 2004 and nine Midwest media markets in 2006 and 2007.
Researchers found that where a story used videotape or still photography, ten percent of the stories featured action in a courtroom (in224
cluding sketches in courts that did not allow cameras); the most
common type of imagery to accompany stories was video or a photo225
graph of the harm that led to the suit.
A fourth study analyzed content of local television (both with and
without court footage) and newspaper coverage of court proceedings
226
It found that television news is
in five different media markets.
weighted more heavily towards violent crime coverage than newspa227
pers. Notably, it studied television coverage of the related criminal
228
trials of John and Lorena Bobbitt. John was charged with sexually
assaulting his wife; she, with genitally mutilating him after the alleged
229
230
assault. His trial did not permit cameras; hers did. The research218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35–36.
Herbert M. Kritzer & Robert E. Dreschel, Reporting Civil Litigation on Local News 3–4 (William Mitchell Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 96, 2008).
Id. at 9.
Id.
C. Danielle Vinson & John S. Ertter, Entertainment or Education: How do Media Cover the
Courts?, 7 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 80, 80 (2002).
Id. at 84.
Id. at 89.
Id.
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ers found that the footage-free television coverage of essentially the
same series of events integrated comments from experts on marital
abuse and contextualized marital rape beyond the facts of the Bobbitt
231
In contrast, television coverage of the trial where cameras
case.
were admitted was restricted to the events taking place in the courtroom. “The sound bites from the networks ran as long as thirty seconds—an eternity when compared to the ten-second sound bites allotted to the candidates during most of the presidential campaigns of
232
the 1990s.” Further, the footage itself was emotionally charged.
The inflections in [Lorena Bobbitt’s] voice and her dramatic pauses after
each word built up tension that reached a peak on the final word of her
sentence. . . . Instead of having the reporters mention that the witnesses
had been emotional, television news showed Lorena Bobbitt crying and
233
shaking on the witness stand.

While the second series of stories concentrated on courtroom testimony, none of them addressed marital abuse as a societal topic, as
234
the camera-free stories had done.
These studies suggest (in a very attenuated and preliminary way)
that television news coverage of court proceedings using footage
from in-court cameras is unlikely to furnish the informationdependent public values identified by the Court as justifying access.
The footage is generally reduced to a very short clip, and it seems
that reporters often lay a voiceover on top of the live sound in the
clip, increasing the opportunity for semantic divergence and decreasing the likelihood of recall or comprehension. Further, footage does
not seem to be selected to enrich the informational content of coverage, but rather to enhance the emotional experience of watching the
story. And there is some evidence that when footage is available, reporters narrow their focus to in-court events rather than seeking to
place stories in social context.
On the other hand, the studies suggest that television news stories
incorporating courtroom footage may be successful in furnishing the
response-dependent public values identified by the Court. Clips
seem to be selected for their emotional weight and provocative content, and are thus more likely to engage viewers and to elicit a response. This conclusion is counterbalanced by evidence that while
some stories present unvarnished clips of court proceedings—as in
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the Lorena Bobbitt trial coverage—others use the footage as a visual
backdrop for reporter voiceovers. That production technique can
sap the footage of its response-dependent value. Most courtroom images capture a sitting witness or judge or a stationary attorney—these
images are made engaging in large part because of the participants’
speech. For instance, researchers examining the Bobbitt trial footage
were impressed that her “voice and her dramatic pauses after each
word built up tension that reached a peak on the final word of her
235
sentence.” The majority of stories lose this component because the
footage is accompanied by a reporter voiceover rather than by live
sound.
In sum, these studies give a very preliminary indication that television news using courtroom footage, like other television news, typically pairs divergent words and pictures that confuse viewers, meaning
that it does not make a significant contribution to the informationdependent public values. They illustrate that television has the potential to contribute to response-dependent public values, but because the most vivid part of a televised court scene—the inflected
words of the trial participants—is often suppressed to allow for reporter voiceovers, television footage of court scenes may lack the vividness that is thought to drive the response-dependent public values
in other television news. The studies strongly suggest that the pressas-proxy conceit is invalid for television news. At the very least, they
show that the proxy cannot be assumed in the absence of documentary evidence that television news uses footage in ways likely to capitalize on either its information-dependent potential or its responsedependent potential. State camera rules generated in reliance on the
proxy are therefore subject to policy-based criticisms. And future
First Amendment arguments for mandatory camera access at the state
or federal level may be destined to fail if advocates robbed of the
proxy cannot proffer freestanding evidence of a “positive contribu236
tion” to self-governance made by cameras.
CONCLUSION
The Court has endorsed a hybrid Sixth Amendment-First
Amendment right of the public to attend and discuss trials and other
court proceedings. Public attendance at trials is thought to furnish a
variety of public values, some information-dependent (conveyance of
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Id. at 91.
Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984).
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information, public scrutiny of the system, and checks on judicial
abuse) and others response-dependent (discharge of citizen duties,
public confidence in the system, and community therapy). The
Court has recognized that the press is an appropriate proxy for
members of the public and that its presence at trials can help realize
the public values that justify open access. However, the Court has
suspended the proxy when the press seeks to use cameras and other
technological means of perception and communication. This suspension was initially motivated by fears that cameras would undermine Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantees. That fear has been
tamped down sufficiently to allow states latitude to adopt their own
policies on cameras. It might seem that absent a Sixth Amendment
cost, camera-bearing press can invoke the press-as-proxy conceit to
argue for a First Amendment right of access. Armed with the Court’s
non-constitutional blessing to seek policy-based access to state courts,
advocates have not pressed the First Amendment access argument.
Instead, they have successfully petitioned state courts to permit cameras, by provisionally disproving a fair trial cost and invoking the
proxy conceit as evidence of a public benefit.
Communications studies literature indicates that the broadcast
press is not a good proxy for the public. Television news in general
(and trial news specifically) does not deploy imagery to reinforce
public understanding, but to detract from it. As a result, it does not
make a “significant contribution” to the information-dependent public values. Further, although television news has the potential to engage citizens emotionally, production techniques that dampen the
vivid qualities of courtroom footage mean that television is not successful in achieving the response-dependent public values.
The demonstrable invalidity of the press-as-proxy conceit for televised trials casts doubt on the public value furnished by cameras, and
on the soundness of current state court camera policies. And it spells
doom for any First Amendment right of access. Absent this
longstanding proxy, policymakers and judges asked to expand courtroom camera programs should demand empirical evidence that televised trials furnish the public values that justify courtroom access.

